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Abstract
The Frame Problem (FP) is a puzzle in philosophy of mind
and epistemology, articulated by the Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy as follows: “How do we account for our apparent
ability to make decisions on the basis only of what is relevant
to an ongoing situation without having explicitly to consider
all that is not relevant?” In this work, we focus on the causal
variant of the FP, the Causal Frame Problem (CFP). Assuming
that a reasoner’s mental causal model can be (implicitly) repre-
sented by a causal Bayes net, we first introduce a notion called
Potential Level (PL). PL, in essence, encodes the relative po-
sition of a node with respect to its neighbors in a causal Bayes
net. Drawing on the psychological literature on causal judg-
ment, we substantiate the claim that PL may bear on how time
is encoded in the mind. Using PL, we propose an inference
framework, called the PL-based Inference Framework (PLIF),
which permits a boundedly-rational approach to the CFP to be
formally articulated at Marr’s algorithmic level of analysis. We
show that our proposed framework, PLIF, is consistent with a
wide range of findings in causal judgment literature, and that
PL and PLIF make a number of predictions, some of which are
already supported by existing findings.
Keywords: Causal Frame Problem; Time and Causality;
Bounded Rationality; Algorithmic Level Analysis
1 Introduction
At the core of any decision-making or reasoning task, re-
sides an innocent-looking yet challenging question: Given
an inconceivably large body of knowledge available to the
reasoner, what constitutes the relevant for the task and what
the irrelevant? The question, as it is posed, echoes the well-
known Frame Problem (FP) in epistemology and philosophy
of mind, articulated by Glymour (1987) as follows: “Given
an enormous amount of stuff, and some task to be done us-
ing some of the stuff, what is the relevant stuff for the task?”
Fodor (1987) comments: “The frame problem goes very
deep; it goes as deep as the analysis of rationality.”
The question posed above perfectly captures what is really
at the core of the FP, yet, it may suggest an unsatisfying ap-
proach to the FP at the algorithmic level of analysis (Marr,
1982). Indeed, the question may suggest the following two-
step methodology: In the first step, out of all the body of
knowledge available to the reasoner (termed, the model), she
has to identify what is relevant to the task (termed, the rele-
vant submodel); it is only then that she advances to the second
step by performing reasoning or inference on the identified
submodel. There is something fundamentally wrong with this
methodology (which we term, sequential approach to reason-
ing) which bears on the following understanding: The rele-
vant submodel, i.e., the portion of the reasoner’s knowledge
deemed relevant to the task, oftentimes is so enormous (or
even infinitely large) that the reasoner—inevitably bounded
in time and computational resources—would never get to the
second step, had she adhered to such a methodology. In other
words, in line with the notion of bounded rationality (Simon,
1957), a boundedly-rational reasoner must have the option, if
need be, to merely consult a fraction of the potentially large—
if not infinitely so—relevant submodel.
Recent work by Icard and Goodman (2015) elegantly pro-
motes this insight when they write: “Somehow the mind must
focus in on some “submodel” of the “full” model (includ-
ing all possibly relevant variables) that suffices for the task
at hand and is not too costly to use.”1 They then ask the fol-
lowing question: “what kind of simpler model should a rea-
soner consult for a given task?” This is an inspiring question
hinting to an interesting line of inquiry as to how to formally
articulate a boundedly-rational approach to the FP at Marr’s
algorithmic level of analysis (1982).
In this work, we focus on the causal variant of the FP, the
Causal Frame Problem (CFP), stated as follows: Upon being
presented with a causal query, how does the reasoner manage
to attend to her causal knowledge relevant to the derivation of
the query while rightfully dismissing the irrelevant? We adopt
Causal Bayesian Networks (CBNs) (Pearl, 1988; Gopnik et
al., 2004, inter alia) as a normative model to represent how
the reasoner’s internal causal model of the world is structured
(i.e., reasoner’s mental model). First, we introduce the notion
of Potential Level (PL). PL, in essence, encodes the relative
position of a node (representing a propositional variable or a
concept) with respect to its neighbors in a CBN. Drawing on
the psychological literature on causal judgment, we substan-
tiate the claim that PL may bear on how time is encoded in
the mind. Equipped with PL, we embark on investigating the
CFP at Marr’s algorithmic level of analysis. We propose an
inference framework, termed PL-based Inference Framework
(PLIF), which aims at empowering the boundedly-rational
reasoner to consult (or retrieve2) parts of the underlying CBN
deemed relevant for the derivation of the posed query (the rel-
evant submodel) in a local, bottom-up fashion until the sub-
model is fully retrieved. PLIF allows the reasoner to carry out
inference at intermediate stages of the retrieval process over
the thus-far retrieved parts, thereby obtaining lower and upper
bounds on the posed causal query. We show, in the Discus-
1In an informative example on Hidden Markov Models (HMMs),
Icard & Goodman (2015) present a setting wherein the relevant sub-
model is infinitely large—an example which makes it pronounced
what is wrong with the sequential approach stated earlier.
2The terms “consult” and “retrieve” will be used interchange-
ably. We elaborate on the rationale behind that in Sec. 5, where we
connect our work to Long Term Memory and Working Memory.
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sion section, that our proposed framework, PLIF, is consistent
with a wide range of findings in causal judgment literature,
and that PL and PLIF make a number of predictions, some of
which are already supported by the findings in the psychology
literature.
In their work, Icard and Goodman (2015) articulate a
boundedly-rational approach to the CFP at Marr’s computa-
tional level of analysis, which, as they point out, is from a
“god’s eye” point of view. In sharp contrast, our proposed
framework PLIF is not from a “god’s eye” point of view and
hence could be regarded, potentially, as a psychologically
plausible proposal at Marr’s algorithmic level of analysis as
to how the mind both retrieves and, at the same time, carries
out inference over the retrieved submodel to derive bounds
on a causal query. We term this concurrent approach to rea-
soning, as opposed to the flawed sequential approach stated
earlier.3 The retrieval process progresses in a local, bottom-
up fashion, hence the submodel is retrieved incrementally, in
a nested manner.4 Our analysis (Sec. 4.1) confirms Icard
and Goodman’s insight (2015) that even in the extreme case
of having an infinitely large relevant submodel, the portion
of which the reasoner has to consult so as to obtain a “suffi-
ciently good” answer to a query could indeed be very small.
2 Potential Level and Time
Before proceeding further, let us introduce some preliminary
notations. Random Variables (RVs) are denoted by lower-
case bold-faced letters, e.g., x, and their realizations by non-
bold lower-case letters, e.g., x. Likewise, sets of RVs are de-
noted by upper-case bold-faced letters, e.g., X, and their cor-
responding realizations by upper-case non-bold letters, e.g.,
X . Val(·) denotes the set of possible values a random quan-
tity can take on. Random quantities are assumed to be dis-
crete unless stated otherwise. The joint probability distribu-
tion over x1, · · · ,xn is denoted by P(x1, · · · ,xn). We will use
the notation x1:n to denote the sequence of n RVs x1, · · · ,xn,
hence P(x1, · · · ,xn) = P(x1:n). The terms “node” and “vari-
able” will be used interchangeably throughout. To simplify
presentation, we adopt the following notation: We denote
the probability P(x = x) by P(x) for some RV x and its re-
alization x ∈ Val(x). For conditional probabilities, we will
use the notation P(x|y) instead of P(x = x|y = y). Likewise,
P(X |Y ) = P(X= X |Y= Y ) for X ∈ Val(X) and Y ∈ Val(Y).
A generic conditional independence relationship is denoted
by (A ⊥⊥ B|C) where A,B, and C represent three mutually
disjoint sets of variables belonging to a CBN. Furthermore,
throughout the paper, we assume that ε is some negligibly
small positive real-valued quantity. Whenever we subtract ε
from a quantity, we simply imply a quantity less than but ar-
bitrarily close to the original quantity. The rationale behind
adopting such a notation will become clearer in Sec. 4.
3We elaborate more on this in the Discussion section.
4The term “nested” implies that the thus-far retrieved submodel
is subsumed by every later submodel (should the reasoner proceeds
with the retrieval process).
Before formally introducing the notion of PL (unavoid-
ably, with some mathematical jargon), we articulate in sim-
ple terms what the idea behind PL is. PL simply induces a
chronological order on the nodes of a CBN, allowing the rea-
soner to encode the timing between cause and effect.5 As we
will see, PL plays an important role in guiding the retrieval
process used in our proposed framework. Next, PL is for-
mally defined, followed by two clarifying examples.
Def. 1. (Potential Level (PL)) Let par(x) and child(x)
denote, respectively, the sets of parents (i.e., immediate
causes) and children (i.e., immediate effects) of x. Also let
T0 ∈ R ∪ {−∞}. The PL of x, denoted by pl(x), is de-
fined as follows: (i) If par(x) = ∅, pl(x) = T0, and (ii) If
par(x) 6= ∅, pl(x) is a real-valued quantity selected from
the interval (maxy∈par(x) pl(y),minz∈child(x) pl(z)) such that
pl(x)−maxy∈par(x) pl(y) indicates the amount of time which
elapses between intervening simultaneously on all the RVs
in par(x) (i.e., do(par(x) = parx)) and x taking its value x
in accord with the distribution P(x|parx). If child(x) = ∅,
substitute the upper bound of the given interval by +∞. 
Parameter T0 symbolizes the origin of time, as perceived
by the reasoner. T0 = 0 is a natural choice, unless the rea-
soner believes that time continues indefinitely into the past,
in which case T0 =−∞. The next two examples further clar-
ify the idea behind PL. In both examples we assume T0 = 0.
y
z
pl(x) = 4
pl(z) = 5
x
(a)
pl(y) = 4.7
pl(x) = 4
pl(t) = 5.6
(b)
pl(y) = 4.7
x
y
z
t
pl(z) = 5
+∞
−∞
+∞
−∞
Figure 1: Relation between PL and time: Example.
For the first example, let us consider the CBN depicted
in Fig. 1(a) containing the RVs x,y, and z with pl(x) =
4, pl(y) = 4.7, and pl(z) = 5. According to Def. 1, the
given PLs can be construed in terms of the relative time be-
tween the occurrence of cause and effect as articulated next.
Upon intervening on x (i.e., do(x = x)), after the elapse of
pl(y)− pl(x) = 0.7 units of time, the RV y takes its value y in
accord with the distribution P(y|x). Likewise, upon interven-
ing on y (i.e., do(y = y)), after the elapse of pl(z)− pl(y) =
0.3 units of time, z takes its value z according to P(z|y).
For the second example, consider the CBN depicted in Fig.
1(b) containing the RVs x,y,z, and t with pl(x) = 4, pl(y) =
4.7, pl(z) = 5, and pl(t) = 5.6. Upon intervening on x (i.e.,
do(x = x)) the following happens: (i) after the elapse of
pl(y)− pl(x) = 0.7 units of time, y takes its value y according
to P(y|x), and (ii) after the elapse of pl(z)− pl(x) = 1 unit of
5More precisely, PL induces a topological order on the nodes of
a CBN, with temporal interpretations suggested in Def. 1.
time, z takes its value z according to P(z|x). Also, upon inter-
vening simultaneously on RVs y,z (i.e., do(y= y,z= z)), af-
ter the elapse of pl(t)−maxr∈par(t) pl(r) = 0.6 units of time,
t takes its value t according to P(t|y,z).
In sum, the notion of PL bears on the underlying time-grid
upon which a CBN is constructed, and adheres to Hume’s
principle of temporal precedence of cause to effect (Hume,
1748/1975). A growing body of work in psychology liter-
ature corroborates Hume’s centuries-old insight, suggesting
that the timing and temporal order between events strongly
influences how humans induce causal structure over them
(Bramley, Gerstenberg, & Lagnado, 2014; Lagnado & Slo-
man, 2006). The introduced notion of PL is based on the
following hypothesis: When learning the underlying causal
structure of a domain, humans may as well encode the tem-
poral patterns (or some estimates thereof) on which they rely
to infer the causal structure. This hypothesis is supported
by recent findings suggesting that people have expectations
about the delay length between cause and effect (Greville &
Buehner, 2010; Buehner & May, 2004; Schlottmann, 1999).
It is worth noting that we could have defined PL in terms of
relative expected time between cause and effect, rather than
relative absolute time. Under such an interpretation, the time
which elapses between the intervention on a cause and the oc-
currence of its effect would be modeled by a probability dis-
tribution, and PL would be defined in terms of the expected
value of that distribution. Our proposed framework, PLIF, is
indifferent as to whether PL should be construed in terms of
absolute or expected time. Greville and Buehner (2010) show
that causal relations with fixed temporal intervals are con-
sistently judged as stronger compared to those with variable
temporal intervals. This finding, therefore, seems to suggest
that people expect, to a greater extent, fixed temporal inter-
vals between cause and effect, rather than variable ones—an
interpretation which, at least to a first approximation, favors
construing PL in terms of relative absolute time (see Def. 1).6
3 Informative Example
To develop our intuition, and before formally articulating our
proposed framework, let us present a simple yet informative
example which demonstrates: (i) how the retrieval process
can be carried out in a local, bottom-up fashion, allowing for
retrieving the relevant submodel incrementally, and (ii) how
adopting PL allows the reasoner to obtain bounds on a given
causal query at intermediate stages of the retrieval process.
Let us assume that the posed causal query is P(x|y) where
x,y are two RVs in the CBN depicted in Fig. 2(a) with PLs
pl(x), pl(y), and let pl(x) > pl(y). The relevant information
for the derivation of the posed query (i.e., the relevant sub-
model) is depicted in Fig. 2(e).
6There are cases, however, that, despite the precedence of cause
to effect, quantifying the amount of time between their occurrences
may bear no meaning, e.g., when dealing with hypothetical con-
structs. In such cases, PL should be simply construed as a topo-
logical ordering. From a purely computational perspective, PL is a
generalization of topological sorting in computer science.
(a) (b)
pl(y)
pl(x) x
t1
t2
y
x
t1pl(t1)
pl(t2)
(c)
x
t1
t2
(d)
x
t1
t2
+∞
−∞
y y y
(e)
x
t1
t2
y
Figure 2: Example. Query variables are shown in orange.
Starting from the target RV x in the original CBN (Fig.
2(a)) and moving one step backwards,7 t1 is reached (Fig.
2(b)). Since pl(y) < pl(t1), y must be a non-descendant of
t1, and therefore, of x. Hence, conditioning on t1 d-separates
x from y (Pearl, 1988), yielding (x ⊥⊥ y|t1). Thus P(x|y) =
∑t1∈Val(t1)P(x|y, t1)P(t1|y) = ∑t1∈Val(t1)P(x|t1)P(t1|y) imply-
ing: mint1∈Val(t1)P(x|t1) ≤ P(x|y) ≤ maxt1∈Val(t1)P(x|t1). It
is crucial to note that the given bounds can be computed
using the information thus-far retrieved, i.e., the informa-
tion encoded in the submodel shown in Fig. 2(b). Taking
a step backwards from t1, t2 is reached (Fig. 2(c)). Using
a similar line of reasoning to the one presented for t1, hav-
ing pl(y) < pl(t2) ensures (x ⊥⊥ y|t2). Therefore, the fol-
lowing bounds on the posed query can be derived, which,
crucially, can be computed using the information thus-far re-
trieved: mint2∈Val(t2)P(x|t2) ≤ P(x|y) ≤ maxt2∈Val(t2)P(x|t2).
It is straightforward to show that the bounds derived in terms
of t2 are tighter than the bounds derived in terms of t1.8 Fi-
nally, taking one step backward from t2, y is reached (Fig.
2(d)) and the exact value for P(x|y) can be derived, again us-
ing only the submodel thus-far retrieved (Fig. 2(d)).
We are now well-positioned to present our proposed frame-
work, PLIF.
4 PL-based Inference Framework (PLIF)
In this section, we intend to elaborate on how, equipped
with the notion of PL, a generic causal query of the form9
P(O = O|E = E) can be derived where O and E denote, re-
spectively, the disjoint sets of target (or objective) and ob-
served (or evidence) variables. In other words, we intend to
formalize how inference over a CBN whose nodes are en-
7Taking one step backwards from variable q amounts to retriev-
ing all the parents of q.
8Here we are implicitly making the assumption that the CPDs
involved in the parameterization of the underlying CBN are non-
degenerate. Dropping this assumption yields the following result:
The bounds derived in terms of t2 are equally-tight or tighter than
the bounds derived in terms of t1.
9We do not consider interventions in this work. However,
with some modifications, the presented analysis/results can be ex-
tended to handle a generic causal query of the form P(O = O|E =
E,do(Z= Z)) where Z denotes the set of intervened variables.
dowed with PL as an attribute should be carried out. Before
we present the main result, a few definitions are in order.
Def. 2. (Critical Potential Level (CPL)) The target vari-
able with the least PL is denoted by o∗ and its PL is re-
ferred to as the CPL. More formally, p∗l :,mino∈O pl(o) and
o∗ :, argmino∈O pl(o). E.g., for the setting given in Fig. 2(a),
o∗ = x, and p∗l = pl(x). Viewed through the lens of time, o
∗
is the furthest target variable into the past, with PL p∗l .
There are two possibilities: (a) p∗l > T0, or (b) p
∗
l = T0,
with T0 denoting the origin of time; cf. Sec. 2. In the sequel
we assume that (a) holds. For a discussion on the special case
(b), the reader is referred to the Supplementary Information.
Def. 3. (Inference Threshold (IT) and IT Root Set (IT-
RS)) To any real-valued quantity, T , corresponds a unique
set, RT , obtained as follows: Start at every variable x∈O∪E
with PL ≥ T and backtrack along all paths terminating at
x. Backtracking along each path stops as soon as a node
with PL less than T is encountered. Such nodes, together,
compose the set RT . It follows from the definition that:
maxt∈RT pl(t) < T . T and RT are termed, respectively, In-
ference Threshold (IT) and the IT Root Set (IT-RS) for T .
For example, the set of variables circled at the stages de-
picted in Figs. 2(b-d) are, the IT-RSs for T = pl(x)− ε,
T = pl(t1)− ε, and T = pl(t2)− ε, respectively. Note that
instead of, say T = pl(x)− ε, we could have said: for any
T ∈ (pl(t1), pl(x)). However, expressing ITs in terms of ε
liberates us from having to express them in terms of intervals
thereby simplifying the exposition in the sole hope that the
reader finds it easier to follow the work. We would like to
emphasize that the adopted notation should not be construed
as implying that the assignment of values to ITs is such a sen-
sitive task that everything would have collapsed, had IT not
been chosen in such a fine-tuned manner. To recap, in simple
terms, T bears on how far into the past a reasoner is con-
sulting her mental model in the process of answering a query,
and RT characterizes the furthest-into-the-past concepts en-
tertained by the reasoner in that process.
Next, we formally present the main idea behind PLIF, fol-
lowed by its interpretation in simple terms.
Lemma 1. For any chosen IT T < p∗l and its correspond-
ing RT , define S :, RT \E. Then the following holds:
min
S∈Val(S)
P(O|S,E)≤ P(O|E)≤ max
S∈Val(S)
P(O|S,E). (1)
Crucially, the provided bounds can be computed using the
information encoded in the submodel retrieved in the very
process of obtaining the RT . 
For a formal proof of Lemma 1, the reader is referred to
the Supplementary Information. Mathematical jargon aside,
the message of Lemma 1 is quite simple: For any chosen
inference threshold T which is further into the past than o∗,
Lemma 1 ensures that the reasoner can condition on S and
obtain the reported lower and upper bounds on the query by
using only the information encoded in the retrieved submodel.
It is natural to ask under what conditions the exact value
to the posed query can be derived using the thus-far retrieved
submodel (i.e., the submodel obtained during the identifica-
tion of RT ). The following remark bears on that.
Remark 1. If for IT T , RT satisfies either: (i) RT ⊆ E,
or (ii) for all r ∈ RT , pl(r) = T0, and mine∈E pl(e) > T , or
(iii) the lower and upper bound given in (1) are identical, then
the exact value of the posed query can be derived using the
submodel retrieved in the process of obtaining RT . Fig. 2(d)
shows a setting wherein conditions (i) and (iii) are both met.
The rationale behind Remark 1 is provided in the Supple-
mentary Information.
4.1 Case Study
Next, we intend to cast the Hidden Markov Model (HMM)
studied in (Icard & Goodman, 2015, p. 2) into our frame-
work. The setting is shown in Fig. 3(left). We adhere to the
xt+1
xt
xt-1
xt-2
yt
yt-1
yt-2
yt-3
xt-3 pl(xt−3) = −5
+∞
−∞
pl(xt+1) = −1
pl(xt) = −2
pl(xt−1) = −3
pl(xt−2) = −4
-1-0 -2-0 -3-0 -4-0 -5-0 -6-0 -7-0 -8-0 -9-0 -10-0
T
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
P
(x
t+
1jy
!
1
:t
)
Figure 3: Left: The infinite-sized HMM discussed in (Icard
& Goodman, 2015) with parameterization: P(xt+1|xt) =
P(x¯t+1|x¯t) = 0.9, and P(yt |xt) = P(y¯t |x¯t) = 0.8. Right: Ap-
plying PLIF on the HMM shown in left. Vertical and hori-
zontal axes denote, respectively, the value of the posed query
P(xt+1|y−∞:t) and the adopted IT T . The vertical bars de-
pict the intervals within which the query lies due to Lemma
1. The dotted curves—which connect the lower and upper
bounds of the intervals—show how the intervals shrink as IT
T decreases.
same parametrization and query adopted therein. All RVs in
this section are binary, taking on values from the set {0,1};
x = x indicates the event wherein x takes the value 1, and
x = x¯ implies the event wherein x takes the value 0. We
assume pl(xt+i) = i− 2.10 We should note that the assign-
ment of the PLs for the variables in {yt−i}+∞i=0 does not af-
fect the presented results in any way. The query of interest is
P(xt+1|y−∞:t). Notice that after performing three steps of the
sort discussed in the example presented in Sec. 3 (for the IT
T =−3−ε), the lower bound on the posed query exceeds 0.5
(shown by the red dashed line in Fig. 3(right)). This obser-
vation has the following intriguing implication. Assume, for
10Note that the trend of the upper- and lower-bound curve as well
as the size of the intervals shown in Fig. 3(right) are insensitive with
regard to the choice of PLs for variables {xt−i}+∞i=−1.
the sake of argument, that we were presented with the follow-
ing Maximum A-Posterior (MAP) inference problem: Upon
observing all the variables in {yt−i}+∞i=0 taking on the value 1,
what would be the most likely state for the variable xt+1? In-
terestingly, we would be able to answer this MAP inference
problem simply after three backward moves (corresponding
to the IT T = −3− ε). In Fig. 3(right), the intervals within
which the posed query falls (due to Lemma 1) in terms of the
adopted IT T are depicted.
Our analysis confirms Icard and Goodman’s insight (2015)
that even in the extreme case of having infinite-sized relevant
submodel (Fig. 3(left)), the portion of which the reasoner has
to consult so as to obtain a “sufficiently good” answer to the
posed query could happen to be very small (Fig. 3(right)).
5 Discussion
To our knowledge, PLIF is the first inference framework pro-
posed that capitalizes on time to constrain the scope of causal
reasoning over CBNs, where the term scope refers to the por-
tion of a CBN on which inference is carried out. PLIF does
not restrict itself to any particular inference scheme. The
claim of PLIF is that inference should be confined within and
carried out over retrieved submodels of the kind suggested by
Lemma 1 so as to obtain the reported bounds therein. In this
light, PLIF can accommodate all sorts of inference schemes,
including Belief Propagation (BP), and sample-based infer-
ence methods using Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC),
as two prominent classes of inference schemes proposed in
the literature.11 For example, to cast BP into PLIF amounts
to restricting BP’s message-passing within submodels of the
kind suggested by Lemma 1. In other words, assuming that
BP is to be adopted as the inference scheme, upon being pre-
sented with a causal query, an IT according to Lemma 1 will
be selected—at the meta-level—by the reasoner and the cor-
responding submodel, as suggested by Lemma 1, will be re-
trieved, over which inference will be carried out using BP.
This will lead to obtaining lower and upper bounds on the
query, as reported in Lemma 1. If time permits, the reasoner
builds up incrementally on the thus-far retrieved submodel so
as to obtain tighter bounds on the query.12 MCMC-based in-
ference methods can be cast, in a similar fashion, into PLIF.
The problem of what parts of a CBN are relevant and what
are irrelevant for a given query, according to (Geiger, Verma,
& Pearl, 1989), was first addressed by Shachter (1988). The
approaches proposed for identifying the relevant submodel
for a given query fall into two broad categories (cf. (Ma-
honey & Laskey, 1998) and references therein): (i) top-down
approaches, and (ii) bottom-up approaches. Top-down ap-
11MCMC-based methods have been successful in simulating im-
portant aspects of a wide range of cognitive phenomena, and giving
accounts for many cognitive biases; cf. (Sanborn & Chater, 2016).
Also, work in theoretical neuroscience has suggested mechanisms
for how BP and MCMC-based methods could be realized in neural
circuits; cf. (Gershman & Beck, 2016; Lochmann & Deneve, 2011).
12The very property that the submodel gets constructed incremen-
tally in a nested fashion guarantees that the obtained lower and upper
bounds get tighter as the reasoner adopts smaller ITs; cf. Fig. 3(left).
proaches start with the full knowledge of the underlying CBN
and, depending on the posed query, gradually prune the irrel-
evant parts of the CBN. In this respect, top-down approaches
are inevitably from “god’s eye” point of view—a characteris-
tic which undermines their cognitive-plausibility. Bottom-up
approaches, on the other hand, start at the variables involved
in the posed query and move backwards till the boundaries
of the underlying CBN are finally reached, only then they
start to prune the parts of the constructed submodel—if any—
which can be safely removed without jeopardizing the exact
computation of the posed query. It is important to note that
bottom-up approaches cannot stop at intermediate steps dur-
ing the backward move and run inference on the thus-far con-
structed submodel without running the risk of compromising
some of the (in)dependence relations structurally encoded in
the CBN, which would yield erroneous inferences. This ob-
servation is due to the fact that there exists no local signal
revealing how the thus-far retrieved nodes are positioned rel-
ative to each other and to the to-be-retrieved nodes—a short-
coming circumvented in the case of PLIF by introducing PL.
Another pitfall shared by both top-down and bottom-up ap-
proaches is their sequential methodology towards the task of
inference, according to which the relevant submodel for the
posed query should be first constructed, and only then infer-
ence is carried out to compute the posed query.13 On the con-
trary, PLIF submits to what we call the concurrent approach
to reasoning, whereby retrieval and inference take place in
tandem. The HMM example analyzed in Sec. 4.1, shows the
efficacy of the concurrent approach.
Work on causal judgment provides support for the so-
called alternative neglect, according to which subjects tend
to neglect alternative causes to a much greater extent in pre-
dictive reasoning than in diagnostic reasoning (Fernbach &
Rehder, 2013; Fernbach, Darlow, & Sloman, 2011). Alter-
native neglect, therefore, implies that subjects would tend
to ignore parts of the relevant submodel while constructing
it. Recent findings, however, seem to cast doubt on alterna-
tive neglect (Cummins, 2014; Meder, Mayrhofer, & Wald-
mann, 2014). Meder et al. (2014), Experiment 1 demon-
strates that subjects appropriately take into account alterna-
tive causes in predictive reasoning. Also, Cummins (2014)
substantiates a two-part explanation of alternative neglect ac-
cording to which: (i) subjects interpret predictive queries as
requests to estimate the probability of the effect when only
the focal cause is present, an interpretation which renders al-
ternative causes irrelevant, and (ii) the influence of inhabitory
causes (i.e., disablers) on predictive judgment is underesti-
mated, and this underestimation is incorrectly interpreted as
neglecting of alternative causes. Cummins (2014), Experi-
ment 2 shows that when predictive inference is queried in a
manner that more accurately expresses the meaning of noisy-
13The computation can be carried out to obtain either the exact
value or simply an approximation to the query. Nonetheless, what
both top-down and bottom-up approaches agree on is that the rele-
vant submodel is to be first identified, should the reasoner intend to
compute exactly or approximately the posed query.
OR Bayes net (i.e., the normative model adopted by Fernbach
et al. (2011)) likelihood estimates approached normative esti-
mates. Cummins (2014), Experiment 4 shows that the impact
of disablers on predictive judgments is far greater than that
of alternative causes, while having little impact on diagnostic
judgments. PLIF commits to the retrieval of enablers as well
as disablers. As mentioned earlier, PLIF abstracts away from
the inference algorithm operating on the retrieved submodel,
and, hence, leaves it to the inference algorithm to decide how
the retrieved enablers and disablers should be integrated. In
this light, PLIF is consistent with the results of Experiment 4.
In an attempt to explain violations of screening-off re-
ported in the literature, Park and Sloman (2013) find strong
support for the contradiction hypothesis followed by the me-
diating mechanism hypothesis, and finally conclude that peo-
ple do conform to screening-off once the causal structure they
are using is correctly specified. PLIF is consistent with these
findings, as it adheres to the assumption that reasoners carry
out inference on their internal causal model (including all
possible mediating variables and disablers), not the poten-
tially incomplete one presented in the cover story; see also
(Rehder & Waldmann, 2015; Sloman & Lagnado, 2015).
Experiment 5 in (Cummins, 2014), consistent with
(Fernbach & Rehder, 2013), shows that causal judgments are
strongly influenced by memory retrieval/activation processes,
and that both number of disablers and order of disabler re-
trieval matter in causal judgments. These findings suggest
that the CFP and memory retrieval/activation are intimately
linked. In that light, next, we intend to elaborate on the ra-
tionale behind adopting the term “retrieve” and using it in-
terchangeably with the term “consult” throughout the paper;
this is where we relate PLIF to the concepts of Long Term
Memory (LTM) and Working Memory (WM) in psychology
and neurophysiology. Next, we elaborate on how PLIF could
be interpreted through the lenses of two influential models of
WM, namely, Baddeley and Hitch’s (1974) Multi-component
model of WM (M-WM) and Ericsson and Kintsch’s Long-
term Working Memory (LTWM) model (1995). The M-WM
postulates that “long-term information is downloaded into
a separate temporary store, rather than simply activated in
LTM”, a mechanism which permits WM to “manipulate and
create new representations, rather than simply activating old
memories” (Baddeley, 2003). Interpreting PLIF through the
lens of the M-WM model amounts to the value for IT be-
ing chosen (and, if time permits, updated so as to obtain
tighter bounds) by the central executive in the M-WM and the
submodel being incrementally “retrieved” from LTM into M-
WM’s episodic buffer. Interpreting PLIF through the lens of
the LTWM model amounts to having no retrieval from LTM
into WM and the submodel suggested by Lemma 1 being
merely “activated in LTM” and, in that sense, being simply
“consulted” in LTM. In sum, PLIF is compatible with both of
the narratives provided by the M-WM and LTWM models.
A number of predictions follow from PL and PLIF. For in-
stance, PLIF makes the following prediction: Prompted with
a predictive or a diagnostic query (i.e., P(e|c) and P(c|e), re-
spectively), subjects should not retrieve any of the effects of
e. Introspectively, this prediction seems plausible, and can be
tested, using a similar approach to (Cummins, 2014; De Neys,
Schaeken, & d’Ydewalle, 2003), by asking subjects to “think
aloud” while engaging in predictive or diagnostic reasoning.
Also, PL yields the following prediction: Upon intervening
on cause c, subjects should be sensitive to when effect e will
occur, even in settings where they are not particularly in-
structed to attend to such temporal patterns. This prediction is
supported by recent findings suggesting that people do have
expectations about the delay length between cause and effect
(Greville & Buehner, 2010; Buehner & May, 2004).
There is a growing acknowledgment in the literature that,
not only time and causality are intimately linked, but that they
mutually constrain each other in human cognition (Buehner,
2014). In line with this view, we see our work also as an
attempt to formally articulate how time could guide and con-
strain causal reasoning in cognition. While many questions
remain open, we hope to have made some progress towards
better understanding of the CFP at the algorithmic level.
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Supplementary Information
S-I Proof of Lemma 1:
Simple use of the total probability lemma yields:
P(O|E) = ∑
S∈Val(S)
P(O|S,E)P(S|E). (S1)
Equation (S1) immediately reveals a simple fact, namely, that
P(O|E) is a linear combination of the members of the set
{P(O|S,E)}S∈Val(S), an observation which grants the validity
of the expression given in (1) in the main text.
The key point which is left to be shown is the following:
(Q.1) Why can the bounds given in (1) be computed using
the submodel retrieved in the process of obtaining the cor-
responding RT for the adopted IT T < p∗l ? This is where
the notion of PL comes into play. To articulate the intended
line of reasoning let us introduce some notations first. Ac-
cording to Def. 3, any chosen IT T induces an IT-RS RT .
Let us partition the set of evidence variables E into three mu-
tually disjoint sets E+T ,ET , and E
−
T , where ET denotes the
set of variables in E which belong to the IT-RS RT (i.e.,
ET :, E∩RT ), E+T denotes the set of variables in E with PLs
≥ T , and finally, E−T denotes the set of variables in E which
are neither in ET nor in E+T (i.e., E
−
T :, E\ (ET ∪E+T )). Note
that, by construction, the PLs of the variables in E−T are less
than the adopted IT T , hence the adopted notation. For ex-
ample, for the setting depicted in Fig. 2(b) (corresponding to
the IT T = pl(x)−ε), ET =∅,E+T =∅, and E−T = {y}. Also,
for the setting depicted in Fig. 2(d) (corresponding to the IT
T = pl(t2)− ε), ET = {y},E+T = ∅, and E−T = ∅. Next, we
present a key result as a lemma.
Lemma S.1. Let P(O|E) denote the posed causal query.
For any chosen IT T < p∗l and its corresponding IT-RS RT ,
the following conditional independence relation holds:
(O⊥⊥ E−T |RT ∪E+T ). (S2)
Proof. The relations between the PLs of the variables in-
volved in the statement (S2) ensures that, according to d-
separation criterion (Pearl, 1988), conditioning on the vari-
ables in RT ∪E+T blocks all the paths between the variables
in O and E−T , hence follows (S2).
The following two-part argument responds to the question
posed in (Q.1) in the affirmative. First, notice that:
P(O|S,E) = P(O|S,ET ,E−T ,E+T )
= P(O|RT ,E−T ,E+T )
(S2)
= P(O|RT ,E+T ). (S3)
Second, note that the process of obtaining RT , namely,
moving backwards from the variables in O∪E+T until RT
is reached, ensures that the submodel retrieved in this pro-
cess suffices for the derivations of P(O|RT ,E+T ). Using the
approach introduced in (Geiger, Verma, & Pearl, 1989) for
identifying the relevant information for the derivation of a
query in a Bayesian network, this follows from the follow-
ing fact: Conditioned on RT ∪E+T , the set O is d-separated
from all the nodes in the set An(O∪E) \RT whose PLs are
less than the adopted IT T . Note that An(O∪E) denotes the
ancesteral graph for the nodes in O∪E. This completes the
proof. 
S-II The Rationale behind Remark 1:
Case (i) and Case (iii) immediately follow from Lemma 1
in the main text. Case (ii) implies that all the ancestors of
variables in O∪E are retrieved, hence the sufficiency of the
retrieved submodel for the exact derivation of the query; see
also Sec. S-III.
S-III On the Special Case of Having p∗l = T0:
In such circumstances, to derive P(O|E), the set of all the
ancestors of variables in O∪E should be retrieved and then
inference should be carried out on the retrieved submodel.
